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Since the Surrealists were specific about their aims, 
their work can be evaluated partly by how well they 
accomplished those aims. In addition, those aims themselves 
have become so ingrained in our current artistic sensibility 
that they go nearly unquestioned as the starting point for 
contemporary poetry and music. Surrealist ideas have been 
overlooked in the avant-gardist rush to reject everything 
past as passé; the Surrealists have thus not been imitated 
by so much as subsumed into subsequent movements.
What the Surrealists were after was a sort of 
affirmative action for the irrational, which would give the 
irrational equality with the rational. The artist, by 
foregrounding his or her repressions, would be able to force 
the audience to do the same, revealing the ways in which 
reality reflects and is shaped by the repressed desire of 
the subject within the strictures of sanctioned discourse.
For the Surrealists, beauty was to be found in the 
illogical juxtaposition of commonplace, but 
decontextualized, objects. The Surrealists emphasized 
inspiration over technique. Painting was thus for the 
Surrealists both a plastic art, the mimetic claims of which 
were always suspect, and a performative art which allowed 
them to enact the shaping of reality by desire. This 
privileging of the power of the image over the reinvention 
of form separates the Surrealists from most other schools of 
avant-garde Modernism.
The Surrealists made use of Freud's discoveries in 
order to access in a systematic way the unconscious, 
repressed elements of the self. They used stream of 
consciousness narrative and free association as their two 
main tropes to emphasize the artistic process as an act of 
discovery; this concern with process is their most important 
legacy, and it flourishes today in American painting, music, 
and especially poetry. This thesis examines the Surrealist 
influence in America, which radiated outward from New York, 
in the poetry of James Tate, Richard Hugo, and John Ashbery 
and in the music of Bill Evans, John Coltrane, Ornette 
Coleman, Circle, and The Art Ensemble of Chicago.
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In his introductory essay to an anthology of
Surrealists' writings and interviews, Herschel B. Chipp
points out one of the initial difficulties of talking about
Surrealism as a set of ideas, products, and methods of
production in the arts. Chipp differentiates between
"accidental" and doctrinaire surrealisms:
Surrealism may be described in two quite different 
ways: in the broadest philosophic sense, as one of 
the important poles toward which art and thought 
have always been drawn, and specifically, as the 
ideology of an organized group of artists and 
writers who from about 1924 on gathered around 
Andre Breton in Paris. (366)
The discussion which follows will deal with the latter 
notion of a doctrinaire Surrealism, and will explore the 
permutations and lines of influence which have radiated 
outward from Breton's group of writers and painters: 
surrealism as it has been assimilated by other artists and 
arts in the post-war period. The Surrealist group, because 
of its relatively cohesive program, was able to validate its 
ideas on a broad scale; since the Surrealists were so 
doctrinaire, their ideas are also particularly suitable as a 
template for cross-media discussion.
Because their methods were, in a unique way, subject to 
and dictated by their goals. Surrealist products, in any 
medium, can be read as attempts to enact those goals, and 
those goals have themselves become so ingrained in our 
current artistic sensibility that they go nearly 
unquestioned as the starting point from which the various
procedural modes of contemporary art emerge. As John
Ashbery puts forth:
What has in fact happened is that Surrealism has 
become a part of our daily lives: its effects are 
seen everywhere, in the work of artists and 
writers who have no connection with the movement, 
in movies, interior decoration, and popular 
speech. (R^ 4)
At the same time, so thoroughly have Surrealist ideas been
assimilated that they have in part been overlooked in the
avante-gardist rush to reject everything past as passe; the
Surrealists have thus not been imitated by so much as
subsumed into subsequent movements.
Surrealist doctrine was established from the birth of
the group in 1924 by Breton, who in that year published the
first Manifesto of Surrealism, which included this
definition of Surrealism:
SURREALISM, n. Pure psychic automatism, by which 
it is intended to express, either verbally, in 
writing, or by any other means, the real process 
of thought. Thought's dictation, in the absence 
of all control exercised by the reason and outside 
all aesthetic or moral preoccupations.
ENCYCL. Philos. Surrealism rests in the belief in 
the superior reality of certain forms of 
association neglected heretofore; in the 
omnipotence of the dream and in the disinterested 
play of thought. It tends definitely to do away 
with all other psychic mechanisms and to 
substitute itself for them in the solution of the 
principle problems of life. (26)
Breton here announces the anti-logos project of Surrealism--
irrational procedures are to be substituted for rational
ones.
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But Breton's opposition of "thought" to "control 
exercised by the reason" and "aesthetic or moral 
preoccupations" is a distinction which, its point made, he 
is quick to undercut. In the same manifesto, Breton calls 
for "the future transmutation of these two seemingly 
contradictory states, dream and reality, into a sort of 
absolute reality, of surreality" (Chipp 370). It appears 
that what Breton was after, intially at least, was a sort of 
affirmative action for the irrational, which if all went 
well would bring the irrational into an equal relationship 
with the rational, creating an artistic consciousness which 
would be able to draw upon the attributes of a healthier 
state of being. The artist, by transcending his or her 
repressions, would be able to force the audience to do the 
same, forcibly revealing the ways in which reality reflects 
and is shaped by the desire of the subject, regardless of 
the essentially superficial repression of desire by society. 
The "superior reality" Breton envisions, then, exists at "a 
certain point of the mind at which life and death, the real 
and the imagined, past and future, the communicalble and the 
incommunicable... cease to be perceived as contradictions" 
(Breton 123).
That the Surrealists were not attempting to entirely 
discard reality in favor of fantasy is a crucial 
realization: realism is an integral aspect of Surrealism, 
and the Surrealists were clearly interested in a certain
4
kind of accessibility, which would allow them to achieve
their desired results. Like Dada before it. Surrealism was
a reaction against the state of Western civilization,
especially as exemplified by its wars, and also against the
art produced by that civilization— which the Surrealists
considered to be complicit in the repression of sexuality,
violence, and the awareness of death, in their minds the
central facts of human existence and recurrent themes in
their work. In this way, according to Peter Nicholls:
Surrealism destroys the limits of a merely useful 
reality, regarding it as no more than a simulacrum 
which thwarts the power of the imaginary, and puts 
in its place not a separate world of 'art', but a 
world which is (like the dream) made up of 
elements of reality that have been exposed to the 
force of desire. (287)
But the Surrealists were neither anti-art per se (according
to Simon Wilson, they "firmly believed in art as the
repository of true and humane values in society" (5)) nor,
according to Nicholls, were they anti-intellectual. Wilson
sees the Surrealists as actively concerned with the fate of
society, in contrast to the Dadaists, who felt themselves to
be hopelessly mired in the soulless moral and imaginative
constructs of the modern world:
The Surrealist programme [was] to tap the creative 
and imaginative forces of the mind at their source 
in the unconscious and... through the increase in 
self-knowledge achieved by confronting people with 
their real nature, to change society. (5)
The Paris Surrealists of the late 1920's were trying to
reshape society, using the shock value of upsetting
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conventional, dualistic hierarchies as their primary tool, 
rather than solely to react against it in loud but 
fruitless, nihilistic protest.
The Surrealists sought also to undermine conventional 
notions of beauty. Their aesthetic called for a "convulsive 
beauty," the famous example of which was voiced by Comte de 
Lautréamont, years before the Surrealists began working 
(Lautréamont was hailed by Breton as "the fixed point for 
Surrealism in literature," and his novel Les Chants de 
Maldoror a Surrealist Bible): "as beautiful as the chance 
encounter on a dissecting table of a sewing machine and an 
umbrella." For the Surrealists, beauty is to be found in 
the encounter, the illogical juxtaposition, of commonplace 
objects, in which normal but dissociated elements of the 
rational world are removed from the context which normally 
allows us to understand them and placed into relationship 
with each other. Says Breton in his typical manner: "Beauty 
will be CONVULSIVE or it will not be."
Surrealism demanded of painting, according to Dawn 
Ades, "that its interest should not lie in the sensuous 
pleasure of the paint surface, but in the enigmatic, 
hallucinatory, or revelatory power of the image" (14). In 
that the Surrealists were concerned with finding ways of 
accessing such imagery rather than developing new ways of 
rendering it, they are set apart from most of the other 
schools of avant-garde Modernism, which tended to focus
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their energies on technique rather than inspiration. For
the Surrealists, painting is both a plastic art, the mimetic
claims of which are always suspect (as in Magritte's famous
"The Treachery of Images") and a performative art which
allows them to enact "the ways in which reality is shaped by
and responds to our desires" (Nicholls 288),
Giorgio de Chirico, the Italian painter whom Breton
considered to be Lautréamont's accidentally Surrealist
counterpart in painting, provides an example of convulsive
beauty, which, like Lautréamont's work in literature,
predates the organization of the Surrealist group in "The
Philosopher's Conquest" [1914; fig. 1]. (Breton also
claimed Dante and Shakespeare for Surrealism (26).) De
Chirico had a huge influence on the Surrealists,
particularly on Breton, but, according to Chipp:
[He] painted the works which interested Breton the 
most... between 1911 and 1917, before the 
existence of either Surrealism or Dada, and 
apparently with no contact with any of the artists
who were so important later for the movement.
(374)
Moreover, De Chirico anticipated the Surrealists not only in
the character of his practice but in his theory as well. In
"The Philosopher's Conquest" De Chirico explores what later 
would become Surrealist obsessions: the clock introduces the 
idea of time, which in the painting seems, under the massive 
smokestacks of the modern industrial horror, to be standing 
still, as the steam from the locomotive rises straight up;
I
fig. 1
and the phallic imagery of the cannon and artichokes plays 
upon the repressed sexuality of the viewer, using a very 
unsexy vegetable to undercut the potency of sexual 
"firepower." But such rational readings are limited; says 
De Chirico of his own work, in perfect proto-Surrealist 
spirit :
To become truly immortal a work of art must escape 
all human limits: logic and common sense will only 
interfere. But once these barriers are broken it 
will enter the regions of childhood vision and 
dream, (qtd. in Chipp 401)
Though De Chirico obviously held similar aesthetic values to
those of the Surrealists, and achieved similar results, it
took the organization of Breton's group about ten years
later to begin to systematize the pursuit of the unconscious
mind's imaginative potentials and to begin to explore
possibilities for tapping the unconscious using techniques
suggested by psychoanalysis. De Chirico's desire to escape
the limits of logic and common sense in order to "enter the
regions of childhood vision and dream" (Chipp 401) and thus
achieve immortality is in line with Freud's division between
the unconscious and the conscious, dream and reality; it is
here that the doctrinaire Surrealists part ways with both of
"them.
Breton's remark in his 1924 Manifesto of Surrealism 
about "the futile task of curing patients" (47) is more than 
a playful or obligatory dismissal of the foundational 
assumption of a cultural institution; according to Nicholls,
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the Surrealists carefully "ignored the theraputic aims of 
pychoanalysis" in order to first invert then explode 
"Freud's hierarchy of consciousness/unconsciousness" (281), 
replacing that notion of a divided self with a notion of an 
integrated self composed of the subject's perceptions of 
reality as they reflect his or her desires. Hence, the 
Surrealists' privileging of the singular power of the image 
over the fragmentation of perspective which had been 
initiated by Cezanne and Henry James, among others, and 
which had dominated the innovatory thinking of avante-garde 
Modernism from the Cubists to Pound, the Futurists to Eliot.
The Surrealist movement made use of Freud's discoveries 
nonetheless in order to help them access in a systematic way 
the unconscious elements of that integrated self which had 
been repressed by society. Breton himself "had studied with 
Freud, was experienced as a military psychiatrist, and was 
eager to apply his knowledge to literature and to painting" 
(Chipp 362). Techniques which the Surrealists developed 
from the theories of pychoanalysis fall roughly into two 
tropes: first, stream of consciousness, in which an 
"automatic", uninterrupted flow of expression is sought, 
producing a continuous and unified narrative which 
"disclose[s] the double articulation of the unconscious with 
the conscious, of desire with reality" (Nicholls 282); 
second, free association, in which the artist responds 
irrationally and instantaneously to something in the real
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world, producing wacky juxtapositions— Lautréamont's sewing 
machine and unbrella and their equivalents. The distinction 
is useful particularly in considering assimilated Surrealist 
works from later in the 20th century, and in placing such 
works in the larger schema of Modernity. Stream of 
consciousness techniques tend to produce Surrealist 
narratives which are still continuous and unifed in temporal 
or grammatical sequence. Free associative techniques, on 
the other hand, generally produce an insistent disconnecting 
of the narrative dots Freud's psychoanalysis wants to trace.
The emphasis Surrealism placed upon the artistic 
process as an act of discovery rather than as a carrying out 
of conventionally established formal structures is also 
traceable to Freud's psychoanalysis. Said Yves Tanguy of 
his process, "The painting develops before my eyes, 
unfolding its surprises as it progresses.... For this reason 
I am incapable of forming a plan or making a sketch 
beforehand" (Ashbery 22). Such a stream of consciousness 
approach to painting, in its attempt to stimulate surprise 
through discovery, is very much akin to Freud's use of the 
stream of consciousness narrative to discover the patient's 
unconscious desires and impulses, but the Surrealists, 
unlike Freud, sought desire in order to revel in it, to 
elevate it to the same status as reason, and to allow the 
interchange between the two to blur the lines between them, 
producing "realistic" imagery in which the subject's desire
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is fully integrated. This aspect of the Surrealist program
has perhaps been most thoroughly assimilated by subsequent
movements in the U.S.; compare Tanguy's statement of 1930
above to this by poet James Tate in 1997; "When I make the
mistake of imagining how a whole poem should unfold, I
immediately want to destroy that plan. Nothing should
supplant the true act of discovery" ("LYP" 3).
Tate's poem "Like a Scarf" illustrates this imperative.
The first sentence announces the initiating conceit: "The
directions to the lunatic asylum were confusing;/most likely
they were the random associations/and confused ramblings of
a lunatic" (WCoF 23). We are visiting the asylum in this
poem, we learn in the first line, and already we begin to
make assumptions which the joke that follows begins to
confirm, setting us at ease with a speaker who is casual,
witty, and a bit irreverent. But Tate quickly sets the
speaker's wit on edge, switching to a slightly awkward
diction in the lines that follow:
We arrived three hours late for lunch 
and the lunatics were stacked up on their shelves, 
quite neatly, I might add, giving credit where 
credit is due.
The orderlies were clearly very orderly, and they 
should recieve all the credit that is their due.
(WCoF 23)
The speaker's insistence on giving out appropriate credit 
for neatness of lunatic stacking sneaks up on us, but is 
clearly over-the-top. The poem's opening joke begins to 
prepare us for this kind of punning and silliness, but the
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dogged repetition of the words "credit" and "due" and the 
overly dense alliteration of "orderlies were clearly very 
orderly" start to undermine our perception of the speaker's 
coherent state of mind. The doctor in the next lines is 
able, upon request, to produce a corkscrew "without a 
moment's hesitation," and the speaker's absurd admiration of 
both the corkscrew and the doctor himself triggers a 
landslide of hilarious and increasingly bizarre surprizes—  
"I was very close to howling and gnashing the gladiola"—  
which destroy what little pretence of the speaker's 
reliability remains, until the hysterical speaker cries out 
toward the end of the poem, "Who could eat liverwurst at a 
time like this" (WCoF 24)?
To this point it is easy to see that Tate has 
consciously undertaken to disintegrate his speaker's sanity 
through the course of the poem and has done so in fine 
style. The language throughout has been tightly controlled, 
communicating on a rational level. There are no problems of 
understanding, disjunct syntax, or shatterings of 
conventional grammar, person, tense, or perspective. In the 
final lines of the poem the poet abandons reasonable speech, 
employing first stream of consciousness and then free 
associative tropes in order to "surprize" even himself;
Lacking a way home, I adjusted the flap in my head
and duck-walked
down to the pond and into the pond and began 
gliding
around in circles, quacking, quacking like a
13
scarf. (WCoF 24-25)
The flap in the head is strange enough, but makes a sort of 
sense for a speaker who has literally lost his mind. Duck- 
walking is the kind of wackiness for which we are, by now, 
prepared. And where would one duck-walk? To the pond, of 
course. It is the moment when the speaker steps off dry 
land and into the pond that his journey becomes truly 
irrational; desire has suddenly altered reality in such a 
way that there is no reasonable way to come to grips with 
it, but the mimetic gaze of the speaker does not flinch— as 
with much Surrealist painting, the poem uses the striking 
image, rather than technical manipulation, to achieve its 
effect.
The speaker has become a duck; he is no longer merely 
duck-walking, and the transition is seamless. The poet's 
stream of consciousness has produced for the poem a reality 
in which the speaker transforms himself into a real duck, 
swimming in a real pond. For him to quack like a duck, 
then, would be redundant. Tate arrives via sound-driven free 
association at the image of a quacking scarf, a "convulsive 
beauty" which, in this poem, makes just the right kind of 
non-sense.
Such use of tropes derived from psychoanalysis by the 
doctrinaire Surrealists to achieve surprize is 
characteristic of assimilated Surrealism. Unlike 
doctrinaire Surrealist poets, Tate's employment of
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psychoanalytic tropes is not necessarily in the interest of 
achieving the purest possible automatism. Like them, 
however, Tate is interested in representing spontanaety, in 
capturing the creative moment in which the unconscious self 
comes into being on the page. This priveleging of process, 
and the innovations through which the Surrealists tried to 
find ways of representing it, is the most important legacy 
of doctrinaire Surrealism.
Among these innovations is collective effort 
toward individual ends; said Breton of the early years in 
Paris, "Never has so precise a common will united us" (qtd. 
in Chipp 417). Breton's group would spend days on end in 
communal hypnosis sessions, taking drugs and starving 
themselves. Painter Joan Miro describes "living on a few 
dried figs a day," starvation being "a great source of... 
hallucinations. I would sit for long periods looking at the 
bare walls of my studio trying to capture these shapes on 
paper or burlap" (qtd. in Chipp 434) . Breton was 
enthusiastic about these group efforts, praising the 
Surrealists' explorations of various states of consciousness 
with characteristically hyperbolic sobriety: "Nothing could 
be more coherent, more systematic, or more richly yielding 
of results than this phase of Surrealist activity" (qtd. in 
Chipp 417) . But the real possibilités of collaborative 
effort are not fully explored in the Surrealists' work; a 
truly spontaneous expression of collaborative free
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association would have to wait another 30 years for Ornette
Coleman's "Free Jazz."
In addition to using hallucinations as a basis for free
association, Surrealist painters developed a number of
techniques for manipulating materials into automatically
produced shapes which would suggest to them material for
their paintings. Miro describes using newspaper collages
for this purpose:
I used to tear newspapers into rough shapes and 
paste them on cardboards. Day after day I would 
accumulate such shapes. After the collages were 
finished they served me as points of departure for 
paintings. I did not copy the collages. I merely 
let them suggest shapes to me. (qtd. in Chipp 434)
Max Ernst used similar free associative techniques to 
produce fantastic landcsapes, including, for his 1942 anti­
war painting "Europe After the Rain," decalcomania, which 
according to Wilson "involves pressing thin paint on the 
canvas with a sheet of glass or other smooth surface" (13). 
In 1925, Ernst had pioneered the technique of frottage; here 
he describes the "insupportable visual obsession" which gave 
him the technical means to work with imagery suggested by 
rough surfaces:
I was struck by the obsession that showed to my 
excited gaze the floor-boards upon which a 
thousand scrubbings had deepened the grooves. I 
decided then to investigate the symbolism of this 
obsession and, in order to aid my meditative and 
hallucinatroy faculties, I made from the boards a 
series of drawings by placing on them, at random, 
sheets of paper which I undertook to rub with 
black lead.... I was surprized by the sudden
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intensification of my visionary capacities and by 
the hallucinatory succession of contradictory 
images superimposed, one upon the other, with the 
persistence and rapidity characteristic of amorous 
memories, (qtd. in Chipp 429)
Poet Richard Hugo, in a 1979 instructional essay on 
writing, put forth his notion of how free associative 
techniques express the author's individuality: "When you are 
writing you must assume that the next thing you put down 
belongs not for reasons of logic, good sense, or narrative 
development, but because you put it there. You, the same 
person who said that, also said this" 5) . By 1979, the
Surrealist notion of an integrated self, the utterances of
which hold together by virtue of their origin, regardless of 
how disjunct they may seem, has been thoroughly assimilated, 
to the point where Hugo can write, "it is impossible to 
write meaningless sequences" 5) .
In Hugo's "In Your Bad Dream" 146), time and space
are shattered as the speaker's perspective leaps from one 
scene to the next without any rhetorical explanation. The 
speaker starts out the poem in a cage, the bars of which 
"are silver in honor of our emperor," and from there 
watches two animals fighting. Hugo's rhetoric here actively 
works against the reader's understanding of the spatial 
relationship between the cage and the scene of the battle: 
"Two animals, too far to name, are fighting." The animals 
are not too far away to name but too far to name; "far"
becomes, in the absence of the locator "away," an adjective
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modifying "animals" in an unfamiliar way. The 
unconventional syntax implies the ellision while also making 
possible, even demanding, other readings, blurring what 
would in conventional usage be a more fixedly defined poetic 
space.
A third of the way into the poem, Hugo leaves behind 
the cage scene entirely, without any warning or explanation, 
initiating a sequence of short vignettes which appear 
entirely disjunct in time and space and entirely devoid of 
thematic relation to each other except by virtue of their 
proximity in the poem:
... Your car's
locked in reverse and running. The ignition 
is frozen, accelerator stuck, brake shot.
You go faster and faster back. You wait for the 
crash.
On a bleak beach you find a piano the tide 
has stranded. You hit it with a hatchet....
On a clean street you join the parade....
For Hugo, the integrated self is the starting point which
justifies the poem's apparent perspectival disunion.
Rational coherence is upset in favor of emotional coherence,
and Hugo is able to presume that the poem's emotional
imperative is able to communicate in other then rational
terms. For the Paris Surrealists, however, the need to
validate their work's claim to an unconsciously produced
meaning was pressing.
In 1929, Andre Masson developed his own version of
Ernst's frottage in response to the difficulty of attaining
18
automatism like that of automatic writing in the relatively
laborious medium of painting. His prose is only slightly
less entertaining than Ernst's:
I had to find a way- That was Sand, I began by 
laying flat a piece of canvas on a stretcher 
covered with raw canvas. On it I threw pools of 
glue that I manipulated. Then I scattered sand, 
then shook the picture to produce splashes and 
pools, sometimes I scraped it with a knife....
And all this done at express speed.... In the end 
it became a sort of wall, a very uneven wall, and 
then at particular moments the layers would 
suggest forms although almost always irrational 
ones. With a little thinned paint I added a few 
lines, but as rapidly as possible and then, 
already calming down a bit, a few touches of
color. Nearly always the sky was indicated at the
top with a little patch of blue and at the bottom 
there would always be a pool of blood, I have no 
idea why. (qtd. in Wilson 14)
As Masson suggests, there is a constant tension in 
Surrealist art between automatism and accessibility; the use 
of shaped materials "which had no meaning but which could
stimulate meaning" (Masson qtd. in Wilson 14) was a basis
for a conscious manipulation of those shapes into 
recognizable forms, which would to varying degrees represent 
realistically the symbolic suggestions of the artists' 
unconscious mind.
Masson's "Battle of Fishes" [1926; fig. 2] is a case in 
point. As the title suggests, Masson has interpreted the 
spontaneously generated sand shapes and enhanced their fish­
like form with added lines to confirm his interpretation for 
the viewer. According to Ades, "Masson was interested in
19
fig. 2
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the moment of metamorphosis, when a line was in the process
of becoming something else" (36). But the act of noticing
that the sand shapes appear "like fish" is a conscious
comparison between the automatic material and what it may
come to represent in the conscious world of the artist: in
effect, the shapes become signifiers which stand in a quite
rational relationship to what is being signified. The
emotional and irrational imperatives which drive the
artist's free associations are restricted as much as they
are stimulated by the automatic material, and so fail (where
Hugo's poetry succeeds) to effectively represent an
integrated reality.
Nicholls summarizes the issue of signification in
"automatic" Surrealist art as a conflict between the desire
"to restore the integral connection of consciousness to the
unconscious" (285) and the means through which that
connection is to be established:
The medium of this connection is language, a 
system of signs whose very mode of operation 
entails a certain negation and separation.... The 
word gives us the meaning of the thing, but in 
doing so replaces what it names, thus condemning 
the thing to a kind of non-being. (285)
But, for Nicholls, this very negation of a reality codified
by law and logic enables the Surrealists' work to operate on
a political level as a reinstatement to the realm of "what
is" of desire, imagination, and art (286).
Seeking to establish in their work a greater degree of
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integration of the conscious and unconscious aspects of the 
self, Surrealist painters in the mid-1920's reacted against 
the "oneiric" (dreamlike) style of De Chirico; they felt 
that such realistic painting was not spontaneous enough, and 
so, led by Miro, they turned to a "biomorphic" style which 
used systems of signification that could be produced very 
rapidly, rendering concrete the suggestions of their 
unconscious minds, with a minimum of interference by the 
passage of time spent laboriously painting. The idea was to 
record a moment of unconscious activity by representing it 
with symbols, rather than trying to reproduce it on the 
canvas, supplanting mimetic convention with a system of 
signs that would serve to both negate conventional reality 
and reify the artists' unconscious impulses.
Miro's "The Birth of the World" [1925; fig. 3] is 
considered the masterpiece of this phase of Surrealism 
(Wilson 40) and, like Miro's collage-based work discussed 
above, is free associative in that it allows the material of 
the background to suggest shapes which become signs. 
According to Nicholls, "the... objective is to be present at 
the moment of creation, when thought takes shape" (285).
But this formulation of automatism suggests that there 
exists a moment prior to the formation of the 
signifier/signifed relationship when thought exists outside 
culture-based hierarchies or, in Breton's words, "aesthetic 
or moral preoccupations" (26). What, then, is the
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automatic, acultural formulation of the encultured self?
How would such a being express itself? Ashbery suggests
that this paradox led the biomorphic movement into a kind of
nihilistic objectivity:
...the governing principle'seems to be not so much 
automatism... as self-abnegation in the interests 
of a superior realism, one which will reflect the 
realities both of the spirit (rather than the 
individual consciousness) and of the world as 
perceived by it. 26)
Miro says of his biomorphic paintings "for me a form is 
never something abstract; it is always a sign of something. 
It is always a man, a bird, or something else" (qtd. in 
Chipp 432). In "The Birth of the World," the black triangle 
represents a bird, according to Miro: "One large patch of 
black [in the already completed, spontaneously produced 
background] seemed to need to become bigger. I enlarged 
it.... It became a triangle, to which I added a tail. It 
might be a bird" (Wilson 40). Miro's uncertainty as to this 
particular sign points to another problem with this style of 
painting: in the absence of De Chirico's spooky realism, the 
painting relys upon the audience's ability to translate the 
painting's signs into the "realism" of its own unconscious 
experience. In order to do so, the audience is required to 
perform an imaginative act very much akin to the one that 
produced the painting in the first place; for an audience 
accostomed to dealing with the world primarily in rational 
terms, an encounter with an encoded unconscious experience
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is unlikely to evoke empathy— in short, the painting will 
tend not to resonate with the audience's repressed 
unconscious awareness. The cruical shock value of the 
earlier, oneiric Surrealism is entirely abandoned in 
biomorphic Surrealism. In order to engage an audience, the 
biomorphic movement developed a style in which, according to 
Ashbery, "abstraction and fanciful figuration coexists"
21), but that figuration compromised the aims of the 
artists' automatic techniques, placing them firmly within 
structures of signification infused with cultural 
judgements. For Ashbery, "automatism was not a viable 
possibility in art until much later, in the hands of artists 
like Jackson Pollock" (R5 26).
In discussing methods of improvisational composition in 
music, Bill Evans describes what may be an analogous 
procedure in that medium: "spontaneous material can be 
worked over and developed.... And the result will somehow be 
in touch with the universal language of understanding in 
music" (qtd. in Gottlieb 426). Evans' 1958 "Peace Piece" 
[Appendix (1)] was composed this way— it was originally 
meant to be an introduction to a Leonard Bernstein show 
tune, but once it took shape Evans decided he'd rather 
record it as an independent song— and it was recorded as an 
improvisation; the melodic spontaneity of the recorded 
version is governed by a preestablished rhythmic and 
harmonic structure which, though it was automatically
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produced, had been "worked over and developed" (Evans in
Gottlieb 426) The result is an irrational music which still
maintains its unity and coherence. As Evans explains, even
in improvisational performance, the jazz musician deals with
spontaneously generated material in a rationally determined
communicative structure:
In jazz, a mistake can be— in fact, must be-- 
justified by what follows it. If you were 
improvising a speech and started a sentence in a 
way you hadn't intended, you would have to carry 
it out so that it would make sense. It is the 
same in spontaneous music, (qtd. in Gottlieb 426)
Evans' analogy between improvisational music and speech is
revealing in terms of technique, though it needs some
further consideration in terms of the relationship of
musical "language" to meaning and signification. Still, it
provides a basis for understanding the music as a stream of
consciousness expression: the irrational right hand is in
constant dialogue with a unified structure communicated by
the rational left.
In that they use automatically produced material as an
initiating basis for imaginative association, the
decalomania, collage, and frottage of Miro, Ernst, and
Masson, the surprize tactics of Tate, Hugo's disjunctive
rhetoric, and the improvisational composition and
performance of Evans all establish relationships in their
work between the irrational and the rational, rather than
replacing entirely the latter with the former, and, as
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Breton says in noting a similar aspect of his procedure for
automatic writing, "therein precisely lies the greatest
interest in the Surrealist exercise" (Chipp 413).
In painting, the limitations of the biomorphic style
were recognized by two newcomers to the Surrealist group:
Rene Magritte and Salvador Dali, who arrived in Paris in
1927 and 1929 respectively. Their ascendance marks a return
in the Surrealist group to oneiric painting and a near
abandonment of biomorphism. During this period, the
Surrealists explored what, according to Ades, "Breton
defines as the other route open to Surrealist painters"
(41). Ades further clarifies the term oneiric thus:
The illusionistic 'hand painted dream picture'
[Dali] is not necessarily dealing with symbolic 
dream images.... It may be using dream images; it 
may use images culled from different dreams; it 
may merely remind us of certain general 
characteristics of dreams. It is illusionistic 
painting, but not of the external world— the model 
is an interior world. (41-42)
Magritte's "Time Transfixed" [1939; fig. 4] is clearly 
a return to the onieiric style of De Chirico, and to some of 
the central concerns of earlier Surrealism; the title 
indicates that the clock on the mantelpiece is a fixed 
marker, rather than a device for the measurement, of time. 
The locomotive in the fireplace is an example of the 
convulsive beauty Breton proposed in the original Manifesto. 
Moreover, the restored realism of this masterpiece of 
Surrealism makes possible the introduction of several other
i '
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thematic concerns. The clearly defined space of the 
painting further emphasizes the incongruity of the scene and 
forces the viewer to wonder whether the locomotive is 
miniature or the room is gigantic, whether the locomotive 
has just emerged from some nether region behind the wall 
(suggested, perhaps, by the eerily empty mirror) or has been 
placed there during the sequential void of transfixed time, 
and whether, in fact, the train is imaginary or is real and 
will crash to the floor should time resume its "natural" 
progression. The deadpan vision of the painting does not 
allow the viewer out of these questions, forcing him or her 
to deal with the scene "objectively" while through its 
improbable character insisting also on the primacy of 
subjective expression.
If Magritte returned the oneiric style to the forefront 
of Surrealist painting, then Dali verified once and for all 
its significance in the greater schema of twentieth century 
art. Ironically, the most famous of Surrealists considered 
his own work to be diametrically opposed not only to 
Surrealism but to all of modern art. There is a sense in 
which that kind of attitude is exactly in line with the main 
thrust of modernist and avant-garde thinking, but rather 
than trying to make a clean break with tradition, as does 
most modern art, Dali wanted to destroy technical modernism 
in painting in order to return to what he considered the 
rigorous virtue of Romantic art. In place of the earlier
29
methods developed by the Surrealists for cultivating
automatism, Dali proposed his Paranoiac-Critical Method
(Chipp 416), which:
uses the external world in order to assert its 
dominating idea and has the disturbing 
characteristic of making others accept this idea's 
reality. The reality of the external world is 
used for illustration and proof, and so comes to 
serve the reality of our mind. (Breton in Chipp
415)
Dali's project is to render the world in such a way that it 
literally verifies the concreteness of the artist's 
unconscious obsessions by fully incorporating them into a 
reality of which those obsessions are a constituent element. 
In the artist's own words, his goal is "the critical and 
systematic objectification of delirious associations and 
interpretations" (qtd. in Chipp 416). The difference 
between Dali and the other Surrealists, then, is that he 
attempted to deal with the irrational productions of the 
unconscious in an obsessively "rational and objective way." 
In that way, Dali's persona enacted his dogma. Both were 
calculated assaults on the weaknesses of biomorphism, 
especially its ambiguity around the signification of an 
already linguistic unconscious: Dali consciously imposes his 
desire on reality, rather than trying, as biomorphism does, 
to render symbolically the unconscious prior to its 
encounter with the external world. For Dali, there is no 
separation between desire and reality; his "objectivity" is 
only another tongue-in-cheek appropriation of the codes he
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wants to subvert.
Dali attempts to resolve the Surrealist conflict 
between "automatic" access to unconcious activity and the 
technical requirements of its expression by recasting the 
act of painting as an objective "reporting" of an inherently 
subjective world. His definition of painting as "hand-done 
color 'photography' of 'concrete irrationality'" {qtd. in 
Chipp 416) is particularly telling: in figuratively 
comparing painting to the "ultra-objective" medium of 
photography, Dali seeks to legitimize an irrational reality 
even more concrete than the rational one of his hero, 
Raphael. In his understanding" of Dali's method, Breton 
suggests that Dali manipulates "the images of the exterior 
world" into a reality consisting “of his impressions,“ which 
allows :
the paranoiac who is their witness to consider the 
images of the exterior world as unstable and 
transitory, or suspect; and what is so disturbing 
is that he is able to make other people believe in 
the reality of his impressions, (qtd. in Chipp
416)
But Breton here misses Dali's point entirely. For Dali, 
"reality" is not composed of subjective impressions which 
can assume visible form in an unreliable world— rather, the 
world is entirely reliable in its state of "conrete 
irrationality"— for the critical paranoiac, the world 
doesn't seem to verify his or her obsessions but actually 
does. What Breton calls an "uninterrupted becoming" (qtd.
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in Chipp 416) of the object of paranoiac-critical activity 
is, for the paranoiac (Dali would say: in all of us) 
actually an always had already become, and the difference 
between these views is as significant as is the difference 
between sleight-of-hand and actual magic.
Dali's "The Persistence of Memory" [1931; fig. 5] 
addresses once again the Surrealist concern with time; the 
"soft watches" indicate not only the inevitable decay which 
goes along with the passage of time, but also the corruption 
of mechanized standards for its measure. The sleeping head 
with the soft watch draped over it exists in another state 
of consciousness just as it does another form— perhaps the 
head is dreaming its own distortion and that of the watches, 
or perhaps the head is dead or dying— it evokes both the 
dream state and the mortal decay of things washed up on the 
shores of thought. What is most striking in the painting is 
the integration of abstract, irrationally produced forms 
which act as signifiers for familiar elements of the 
"exterior world" and the realistic deadpan of Magritte; Dali 
paints his unconscious reality as a Renaissance painter 
would imitate nature, and in doing so seeks to reveal the 
underrepresented pathos of concrete realism.
In discussing the Art Ensemble of Chicago's 1991 
rendition of Thelonius Monk's "'Round Midnight" [Appendix 
(2)], band leader Joseph Jarman suggests that its 
"deconstruction" (qtd. in Mandel) of Monk's composition is
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akin to "The Persistence of Memory." Says Jarman 
mysteriously about AEC's piece, "Midnight is not 
approaching, but has already passed" (qtd. in Mandel).
Though Jarman's parallel seems tenuous, it is interesting to 
consider the expressive content of the song in relation to 
Dali's painting; in each, there is clearly an obsession not 
only with time but with the way in which time is measured 
and in which that measurement is communicated. The soft 
watches in "The Persistence of Memory" are as insistently 
subversive, in terms of the ordinary, practical function of 
watches, as are the overlapping and variegated aiarm clock 
chimes in "'Round Midnight," and as Dali seeks an engagement 
with the masters of his tradition, so also AEG wants to 
engage with the conventions of its medium as they have been 
defined by Monk. Moreover, the album on which this song is 
heard is titled "Dreaming of the Masters": the emphasis that 
this title places on changing or altered consciousness and 
engagement with tradition, coupled with Jarman's comment in 
the album's introductory essay, suggests that the connection 
between AEC's work and Dali's may not be limited to an 
incidentally common thematic interest. It may be that AEG 
wants to expose the essence of Monk's work in a way that is 
analogous to Dali's desire to legitimize unconscious and 
irrational elements of reality, and that such parallel 
agendas may promote the employment of methods which can be 
compared outside of the media which govern their expression.
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The idea that music might be an appropriate medium for
Surrealist expression was unwelcome and even repugnant to
the Paris Surrealists. But Breton's objections to music as
a valid area of interest for Surrealists (he was also the
author of the early statement "Everyone knows there is no
Surrealist painting") are more than a little mysterious:
Auditive images, in fact, are inferior to visual 
images not only in clearness but also in 
strictness, and with all due respect..., they 
hardly seem intended to strengthen in any way the 
idea of human greatness, (qtd. in Chipp 403)
The idea that music expresses itself through images is
itself more than a little naeve, a tempting comparison of
music to visual forms of expression which apparently leads
Breton to the conclusion that music lacks clarity. (What
sort of clarity? Was Breton hard of hearing?) To say that
music lacks also "strictness," if by that he means rigor of
creative procedure or technique, or perhaps even the
necessity of disciplined practice, seems as purely snobbish
as does the criterion which Breton suggests as the measure
of superior expression. Interestingly, it is De Chirico who
pinpoints the crucial issue which Breton perhaps senses; the
forerunner of Surrealist painting, itself considered at one
point to be a contradiction in terms, points out the quality
of music which for interests of comparison is its definitive
feature. Says De Chirico, "Music cannot express the non
plus ultra of sensation. After all, one never knows what
music is about" (qtd, in Chipp 398). In other words, music
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is the only art which is not representational in practice.
But it is exactly this failure of knowing, a knowing which
in literature and painting is rendered via signification,
which jazz critic Gene Lees points out as the primary virtue
of musical expression:
Our vocabulary for the nuances of emotion is 
inadequate, though we can somewhat compensate for 
this by creating compound words such as happy-sad, 
wistful-joyous, and the like. But music can go 
beyond that. It doesn't and of course can't name 
these subtle nameless emotions. It can evoke 
them. (Gottlieb 420)
Thus, music sidesteps signification's quality of "obtaining
meaning at the expense of the thing it names" (Nicholls 285)
by expressing the thing without representing it.
Where Lees suggests that music operates on an evokative
emotional level outside the realm of language, Amiri Baraka
defines a context for that evokation, in which the emotional
content of the music can be read:
The notes mean something; and the something is, 
regardless of stylistic considerations, part of 
the black psyche as it dictates the various forms 
of Negro culture. (15)
Moreover, the context of black culture in America at the
time of the early development of jazz suggests another
affinity with the motivations behind Surrealist production
in post-war Europe; just as the Surrealist aesthetic
developed in reaction and in opposition to the dominant
conventions of rational discourse which directly and
indirectly glorified the mechanization of all areas of
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European culture, so too black music developed as an
alternative and as a response to linguistic strictures which
in white America prohibited the full expression of black
experience. As Baraka explains:
Negroes played jazz as they had sung the blues or, 
even earlier, as they had shouted and hollered in 
those anonymous fields, because it was one of the 
few areas of human expression available to them.
(12)
Further, and contrary to Baraka's earlier assertion, 
"stylistic considerations" have everything to do with the 
context in which Baraka suggests we should understand jazz, 
and as a reaction to expressive prohibitions developed along 
some of the same lines as Surrealist literature and painting 
in Europe, are significant in terms of both procedure and 
product. Certainly jazz developed quite independent of 
Surrealism, but just as certainly jazz was affected by it in 
the historical moment where the course of the evolution of 
jazz intersected with the dispersal of Surrealist ideas 
through the art community in this country. Because of the 
agenda so clearly articulated by the Surrealists, which 
operates on the extra-media level of thought and 
communication as well as on levels which are concerned 
primarily with questions produced by the particulars of 
media, there is opportunity to make useful comparison 
between the methods employed in these disparate cultural 
contexts and even between what generalizations can be made 
about their results.
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Miro was less resistant than De Chirico and Breton to 
the expressive possibilities of music, and even utilized 
music as a basis for free associative procedures in his own 
work:
In 1939 I began a new stage in my work which had 
its basis in music and nature.... Music had always 
appealed to me, and now music in this period began 
to take the role poetry had played in the early 
'20's. (qtd. in Chipp 434)
Miro seems to have discovered that the "problem" which De
Chirico identifies of music's self-referentiality is, as
Lees suggests, not a problem at all, but rather the chief
virtue of the medium, especially in terms of the Surrealist
project. Miro mentions in his discussion of music's
influence on his work being exposed to classical and chamber
music, which were of course much more entrenched in French
culture than the American form of jazz; if he had heard any
jazz, it apparently didn't affect him as strongly. What
Miro may have overlooked, and what De Chirico and Breton
weren't able to see, is that jazz, because of its self-
referential quality and its spontaneous, improvisational
form, may be uniquely qualified to carry out the Surrealist
project by providing through its own automatism access to
pre-linguistic unconscious emotions and impulses which
cannot be expressed in words, but which can be evoked in
musical language without having to filter them through the
rationalizing, generalizing procedure of signification.
John Coltrane's 1960 "Giant Steps" [Appendix (3)], in
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which the solo improviser performs an irrationally produced 
automatism within the rationalizing structures of rhythm and 
harmony, themselves created in an automatic compositional 
procedure and subsequently worked over, is in some ways akin 
to the stream of consciousness, automatic writing produced 
by Breton and the other Surrealist writers. The 
compositional structures of the song, which alternate 
improvisational solos and pre-established refrains create a 
rational unity within which the irrational automatism of the 
improvisation takes place. Though the improvisational 
sections seems not to make musical "sense," the song as a 
whole maintains a structural unity by establishing a pattern 
of refrain sections which the listener is able to recognize 
as thematic. Coltrane presents us here with a modernist 
consciousness— structurally bound to time and space, 
coherent yet subjective, cohesive yet irrational— which is 
comparable to that of Magritte's "Time Transfixed."
So also Ornette Coleman's 1965 "European Echoes" 
[Appendix (4); from Live] maintains its expressive unity by 
alternating wildly dissonant solos with a recognizable 
refrain, and like AEC's "'Round Midnight," Coleman's piece 
seeks out an engagement with its musical heritage in order 
to call into question the rational structures of the 
tradition, which, for Coleman, restrict the full range of 
his musical self-expression. The rhythm and melody of the 
refrain calls to mind a simple, three-note waltz, and
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through its repetition it becomes a sort of simulacrum of 
European folk tradition, a lullaby from which Coleman is 
quick to wake us. The improvisational sections use the 
refrain as a template, but the oversimplified melody nearly 
vanishes into gradually more radical atonality, surfacing in 
fragmented form only often enough to remind us that it is 
still present as a musical equivalent of poetry's "ghost 
meter."
In contrast. Circle's 1970 "Ballad" [Appendix (5)] is 
more akin to the Surrealist trope of free association; this 
composition is structured in such a way that the musicians 
are freer to improvise in response to each other, rather 
than along lines pre-established and fixed. Similarly, 
Coleman's 1960 "Free" [Appendix (6); from Change] is a 
collective improvisation, and as one of the first such 
recordings is a direct forerunner of "Ballad." In "Free," 
Coleman's band members "each [go] his own way and still 
[add] tellingly to the group endeavor" (Coleman, Change). 
According to Coleman, for this song "there [is] no 
predetermined choral or time pattern," and in it "we got a 
spontaneous, free-wheeling thing going here" (Change). The 
result in each of these works is a fragmented, irrational 
expression of a postmodern consciousness, which has no 
internal cohesion and in which the musicians interact within 
an irrationally shifting field of spontaneously generated 
structures; each song creates a fragmentary music based on
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surprising juxtapositions, a music of "convulsive beauty"
which in terms of its product fulfills exactly the
Surrealist program.
In terms of process, also, Coleman's description of his
music is reminiscent of the Surrealist painters'
descriptions of their work, and of their ideas about
collective hypnosis:
When our group plays, before we start out to play, 
we do not have any idea what the end result will 
be. Each player is free to contribute what he 
feels in the music at any given moment. We do not 
begin with a preconcieved notion as to what kind 
of effect we will achieve. When we record, 
sometimes I can hardly believe that what I hear 
when the tape is played back to me is the playing 
of my group. I am so busy and absorbed when I 
play that I am not aware of what I'm doing at the 
time I'm doing it. (Coleman, Change)
Even though it's unlikely that Coleman consciously employs
techniques which were pioneered by the Surrealists, the
reactions of his audience and critics to his music are
certainly conditioned by an indirect awareness of the
Surrealists' project which has existed for some time in the
U.S. That Baraka could write of Coleman that his "screams
and rants are only musical once one understands the music
his emotional attitude seeks to create" (15) demonstrates an
openness to expression which does not make rational sense
which is a direct product of the Surrealists' influence in
American arts.
As early as 1913, Dada entered the consciousness of the 
American avant-garde; accoding to Chipp, after the Armory
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Show, which shook the very pillars of American art and
literature, Francis Picabia "remained [in the U.S.] to
inject a proto-Dada spirit into Alfred Stieglitz's review.
Camera Work, and later into 291, the journal of Stieglitz's
gallery" (368). Even more significantly, during and after
World War II a number of important Surrealists lived in the
U.S., among them Breton, Ernst, Masson, Miro, and Dali
(Wilson 12), and had a huge influence on the "New York
School" of American artists and writers, who went on to have
profound influence upon the direction of the post-war arts
in this country. In 1944, Jackson Pollock commented on the
presence of these painters in the U.S.:
The fact that good European moderns are now here 
is very important, for they bring with them an 
understanding of the problems of modern painting.
I am particularly impressed with their concept of 
the source of art being the Unconscious, (qtd. in 
Chipp 546)
As William Rubin points out, "what Pollock really took from 
Surrealism was an idea— automatism— rather than a manner" 
(177). Indeed, it is the idea that the unconscious is "the 
source of art," rather than the technical or stylisitic 
innovations of the Surrealists, which has been assimilated 
in American art. Without the ideological grounding of 
Surrealist ideas, according to Ashbery, "the signature art 
of our time would not have been produced" ( ^  7).
Of course, the stylistic aspects of doctrinaire 
Surrealism have been rejected many times over by the various
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emergent avante-gardes, but, says Rubin, "With each new 
stylistic wave the vestiges of... Surrealist ideas have 
become further attenuated and diffused" (185). As 
Surrealism has been rejected, in other words, its founding 
assumptions have become more and more entrenched.
In poetry, the expatriate Surrealists influenced such 
early postmoderns as W.C. Williams and Wallace Stevens, and 
along with and through them helped shape John Ashbery,
Robert Greeley, Frank O'Hara, and others, in lines of
influence which radiated outward from the New York School
and the Black Mountain group. According to Ashbery,
"Surrealism has influenced us in so many ways that we can
hardly imagine what the world would be like without it" (RS 
5). His long poem "Self Portrait in a Convex Mirror" is 
among the most influential poems in English of the second 
half of this century, and its opening section summarizes the 
evolved Surrealism which American poetry has assimilated 
while putting its own postmodern slant on Surrealist 
concerns,
Even prior to the opening lines of "Self Portrait," 
Ashbery initiates the first layer of what will become 
through the course of the poem an exponentially multiplying 
doubleness, as the title itself both announces the subject 
of the poem (Parmigianino's self-portrait) and qualifies the 
poem itself, which is also the poet's self-portrait.
Ashbery's doubleness here is deliberate and is something
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altogether different from ambiguity: where ambiguous poetic 
images end up not being quite one thing or quite the other, 
Ashbery's trick mirrors reveal both a "transparent" window- 
view on the soul of their maker and a confounding array of 
"reflective" surfaces which ultimately return the viewer’s 
now distorted but no less accurate gaze back upon his or her 
own responses to the text. The poem thus engages from the 
outset the reader's desire by allowing (or forcing) him or 
her to choose between a number of figurative realities, 
producing a situation where the poem itself exists in 
multiple and contradictory narrative states, any of which is 
"real" in the mimetic sense.
Ashbery's realism is surreal in the truest sense of 
doctrinaire Surrealism and effective in forcing the reader 
to integrate an interpretive desire with an apprehension of 
the poem's familiar lyric format. The poem is about a 
portrait of a self as seen in a convex mirror ("the 
portrait/is the reflection once removed"), but it is also 
both the portrait and the mirror of the poet's self, and 
this doubleness comments upon the poem's initial conceit, 
which is an encounter of the lyrical self with a rendering 
of an Other done by himself as he has seen himself othered 
by the artificial mechanism of the convex mirror. Thus, 
before the lyrical encounter of speaker with Other, Ashbery 
has already brilliantly undermined any attempt one might 
make at a reason-based or mimetic reading, establishing for
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the poem a shifting, "super-real" state of which Breton 
would certainly have approved.
The poem's opening sentence is an open fragment, half a 
simile which the title seems, but fails, nearly to complete. 
Here Ashbery's grammar enacts his rhetoric: the fragment 
suggests meanings but fails to commit, announcing that 
there's something to be said then refusing to say it, just 
as Parmigianino's convex aspect suggests that his hand 
simultaneously offers and retracts some secret of which the 
"sequestered" face reveals nothing. At least, Ashbery seems 
to offer such an interpretation of the painting and to 
explain his intention to mimic its method even as he does 
so :
As Parmigianino did it, the right hand 
Bigger than the head, thrust at the viewer 
And swerving easily away, as though to protect 
What it advertises. 188)
The opening lines of the poem, then, suggest that the
missing half of the simile might be something like "I'll do
it," an announcement and an enactment of the poem's intended
conceit. So Ashbery lets us in a bit on how he's planning
to proceed while concealing just what it is he's hoping to
do in his self-portrait. Nonetheless, we are warned already
that what is advertised (meaning, personal insight, or
truth) is also protected by the very mechanism (a rhetorical
convex mirror) through which its presence is promised. We
know already that "the right hand" of action and process is
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"bigger than the head" of rational sense, an inversion of 
Enlightenment hierarchy typical of Surrealist work, and that 
a pervasive rhetorical doubleness, like that of double 
imagery in Surrealist painting by Picasso, Dali, and others, 
will continually defer the location of a fixed, mimetic 
realism.
But Ashbery isn't the obstructionist, out to hide his
real concerns. On the contrary, he is critical of an overly
technical approach which might offer "false disarray as
proof of authenticity" 189) . The relationship of
Ashbery's subject(s) to time and space is continual rather
than fragmented, not fixed but suspended "Lively and intact
in a recurring wave/Of arrival" 188), "treated humanely"
on the page. Thus, he is able to consider "the soul" with
which he is concerned at his leisure in the lyrical role of
first-person viewer;
But how far can it swim out through the eyes 
And still return safely to its nest? The surface 
Of the mirror being convex, the distance increases 
Significantly; that is, enough to make the point 
That the soul is a captive, treated humanely, kept 
In suspension, unable to advance much farther 
Than your look as it intercepts the picture. (SP 
188)
The eyes, comic "windows to the soul," are artificial ones, 
painted in such a way that the soul only seems to advance 
through them, as though poised on the surface of the page, 
ready to leap off. It is only the viewer's look that 
intercepts the soul, and that look penetrates only to the
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surface of the mirror/painting/poem. It is this "too plain"
secret, the captive condition of the soul as rendered in
art, which the portrait(s) reveals, and the soul is captive
not even of the surface on which it is rendered but of the
fleeting interest of the viewer:
...the soul is not a soul.
Has no secret, is small, and it fits 
Its hollow perfectly: its room, our moment of 
attention. {S^ 188)
The soul is suspended not in time but out of it, is brought
into being more by the attention of the viewer than by the
artifice of the maker, and is characterized finally, Ashbery
continues, by the mere words (which do not then do exist)
which the viewer fruitlessly uses to speculate about the
"meaning of the music":
That is the tune but there are no words.
The words are only speculation 
(From the Latin speculum, mirror):
They seek and cannot find the meaning of the 
music. ( ^  188)
The "soul" is visible only as "postures of the dream," a
"tune" which seems not to communicate outside its own
discrete structure, a "motion" of which we can view only the
aftereffects. We are left to deal with the things we can
say about what we see— words which for Ashbery are
themselves, at heart, another reflective surface. This
reflection, the words of Ashbery's self-portrait, "life
englobed" on the figuratively convex surface of the page, is
all we have:
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One would like to stick one's hand 
Out of the globe, but its dimension,
What carries it, will not allow it. {S^ 189)
The reflective surfaces of our perspectives restrict us to
understanding only what we can "see." Ashbery here
introduces one of the central concerns of the poem: the
boundaries of the self are defined in language, and laid out
performatively in the act of self-representation. But, for
Ashbery as for the Surrealists, the self is never merely its
expression but exists also as a shadow within that
expression, as the "othered self" relegated to a paradoxical
non-being by its own act of naming itself.
But later, we find that surfaces, though frustrating,
are not void of the capacity for meaning:
...your eyes proclaim
That everything is surface. The surface is what's 
there
And nothing can exist except what's there. (SP 
190}
Ashbery is tongue-in-cheek here. The "nothing" is exactly 
the thing he wants to get at, because the true self exists 
as non-thing, the absence of which only the presence of 
defining surfaces makes us aware. We can percieve the 
presence of the shadow self, the non-linguistic "hollow" of 
the soul, at the point where signification fails— within its 
own failure to signify itself. The attempt, then, is 
worthwhile, successful in its failure.
Later, in a gesture which finally reconciles the desire 
to know truth through words with the contingency that
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desire, through words, gives shape to the very surfaces of a
"reality" they are meant to describe, Ashbery writes:
And just as there are no words for the surface, 
that is.
No words to say what it really is, that it is not 
Superficial but a visible core, then there is 
No way out of the problem of pathos vs . 
experience. 190)
In this opening passage Ashbery, with Jackson Pollock and
Ornette Coleman, aligns himself with a kind of thinking
inherited from the doctrinaire Surrealists, and which,
partly through Ashbery's influence, permeates much postwar
poetry in the U.S., namely, that reality is made up of
perceived surfaces exposed to and altered by the force of
irrational, subjective desires: pathos and experience cannot
be concieved as being in opposition to each other, but only
as mutual contributors to versions of "what's there." For
Ashbery, desire is made of dreams and hinted-at motions
which are both revealed and hidden in the act of speech, by
words, and the surfaces they define are ultimately the
dimensions of an inexpressable self.
Coleman, certainly, is aware of the problem of self-
expression in a culture governed by the linguistic
proscriptions of logic, and that that problem exists outside
the mere conventions of media and genre:
With my music, as is the case with some of my 
friends who are painters, I often have people come 
to me and say, 'I like it but I don't understand 
it'.... [In my music] there is a continuity of 
expression, certain continually evolving strands 
of thought that link all my compositions together.
49
Maybe it's something like the paintings of Jackson 
Pollock. (Coleman, Change)
Through an impressive array of important American artists,
the ideas of the Surrealists, we can now see, had an
influence the scope of which is hard to overestimate on the
U.S. arts. Surrealist procedures, and along with them ways
of understanding art which are based on Surrealist ideas,
have been assimilated (though rarely in pure form) to the
extent that many layers of meaning in contemporary U.S. art
would be inaccessible, or wouldn't exist in the first place,
but for Surrealism, which succeeded in securing validity in
the arts for irrational procedures and modes of expression
which are now the cornerstone of our artistic consciousness.
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